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IN DEFENCE OF THEOLOGICAL COMPATIBILISM
Thomas P. Flint

William Hasker has recently attacked the thesis that divine foreknowledge
and human freedom are compatible. Hasker sees only two ways his opponents
could respond to his argument: claim that we have causal power over God's
past beliefs, or claim that we have counterfactual power over them. Hasker
employs two principles in an attempt to show that the latter of these compatibilist responses collapses into the first, which he then criticizes. I argue
that Hasker fails to discredit the second response, for his principles would
be rejected by his adversaries, and his defence of the second principle is
tantamount to begging the question.

The argument for the incompatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge has recently been defended in a lucid and provocative manner by
William Hasker.! As Hasker sees it, the most plausible means of defending
what he calls compatibilism (the thesis that our freedom is not in conflict
with God's prescience) requires that we have either counterfactual power
over the past or causal power over the past. After arguing that the former
type of power collapses into the latter type in the case of God's beliefs,
Hasker contends that one can hold that we have causal power over the past
only if one is willing to surrender the libertarian notion of freedom. Since
few of those who embrace compatibilism re divine foreknowledge would be
eager to enter into a permanent relationship with compatibilism re freedom,
it follows that few philosophers should find the former type of compatibilism
appealing.
Despite the genuine virtues exhibited by his paper, it seems to me that
Hasker's argument comes very close to exhibiting that tempting and perfidious (albeit difficult to define) philosophical vice of begging the question.
As one might expect with a philosopher of Hasker's caliber, the problem does
not lie at the surface. Nevertheless, it seems clear to me that a bit of excavation will suffice to reveal his argument's shaky foundations.
Before digging into its deficiencies, let us first consider the argument in
the form in which Hasker presents it. Mercifully granting Jones and his
lawnmower a sabbatical, Hasker presents the argument via the example of
"Clarence, an afficionado [sic] of cheese omelets, and ... the question, will
Clarence have such an omelet for breakfast tomorrow morning, or won't he?"
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If we assume the answer to be affirmative, Hasker suggests, we can construct
the following, easily generalizable, argument for incompatibilism:
(B1) It is now true that Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast
tomorrow. (premise)
(B2) It is impossible that God should at any time believe what is false, or
fail to believe anything which is true. (Premise: divine omniscience)
(B3) Therefore, God has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese
omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (From 1,2)
(B4) If God has always believed a certain thing, it is not in anyone's power
to bring it about that God has not always believed that thing. (Premise:
the unalterability of the past)
(B5) Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to bring it about that God has
not always believed that he would have a cheese omelet for breakfast.
(From 3, 4)
(B6) It is not possible for it to be true both that God has always believed that
Clarence would have a cheese omelet for breakfast, and that he does
not in fact have one. (From 2)
(B7) Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to refrain from having a cheese
omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (From 5, 6) So Clarence's eating the
omelet tomorrow is not an act of free choice.

As Hasker sees it, there are two compatibilist ways of responding to this
argument which need to be taken seriously. On the one hand, one might
(following George Mavrodes) simply reject (B4).2 That is, one might contend
that a person can indeed have causal power over the past. Hence, even if (B3)
is true, Clarence might well still even now have the power to cause it to be
the case that God didn't believe that Clarence would have a cheese omelet
for breakfast tomorrow. On the other hand, one might (following Alvin
Plantinga) accept (B4), but reject the inference from (BS) and (B6) to (B7).3
According to Hasker, those who take this second option see us as having, not
causal power over the past, but only what he calls counterfactual power over
the past. Clarence, for example, does not have the power to cause it to be the
case that God didn't believe he would make the omelet; but he does have the
power to do something (namely, refrain from making the omelet) such that,
if he were to do it, then God would never have believed that Clarence would
make an omelet for breakfast tomorrow.
Hasker's strategy in meeting these responses is one of unite and conquer.
He first attempts to show that, at least in the case of God's past beliefs, the
distinction between causal and counterfactual power over the past collapses;
hence, the Plantingean position is tenable only if the Mavrodean position is
defensible. He then attempts to undermine the Mavrodean stance by arguing
that the notion of freedom which it employs is not a true libertarian notion.
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Of course, an examination of the second half of this strategy is necessary
only if one concludes that the first half-Le., the purported fusion of
Plantinga and Mavrodes-has in fact been accomplished. Now, to show that
Plantinga's position dissolves into Mavrodes', one needs to show that (B7)
does indeed follow from (B5) and (B6). Suppose we employ the following
abbreviations:
P = Clarence has the power to bring it about [Le., to cause it to be the case]
that

a

=

Clarence will not have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow

b

=

God has always believed that Clarence would have a cheese omelet for
breakfast tomorrow

We could then represent (B5) through (B7) as:
(BS) -P-b
(B6)- 0 (a & b)
(B7)- Pa

Hasker's task, then, is to show that [(B5) & (B6)] implies (B7); that is, that
(X) [-P-b & - <> (a & b)] ::> -Pa 4

Hasker attempts to support (X) by appealing to two power entailment principles which he borrows from Thomas Talbott. s The first of these reads as
follows:
(PEP3) If (a) it is within S's power to bring it about that P is true and (b) it
is within S's power to bring it about that P is false and (c) P entails
Q and not-P entails not-Q, then it is within S's power to bring it about
that Q is true.

Now, though it is not immediately evident how (PEP3) is supposed to justify
(X), it seems clear that something like Hasker's argument would succeed
were this principle to be accepted. Let" P" stand for "Clarence refrains from
having a cheese omelet tomorrow", "Q" for "God has always believed that
Clarence would refrain from having a cheese omelet tomorrow" and "S" for
Clarence. Interpreted in this way, all three parts of the antecedent of (PEP3)
will be affirmed by Plantingeans, hut its consequent will surely be denied,
for that consequent asserts that Clarence has causal power over God's past
beliefs, and as we have seen, the Plantingean wishes to grant Clarence only
counterfactual power. If (PEP3) is true, then, the Plantingean position is
surely in trouble.
But why think that (PEP3) is true? Hasker says little in its defence. Rather
than argue for it, he merely quotes (approvingly) Talbott's defence of it.
(PEP3), says Talbott, "seems not only true but obviously true. Where P and
Q are logically equivalent, it could hardly be up to me whether or not P is
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true unless it were also up to me whether or not 0 is true."6 Though what
Talbott says here is surely plausible, it actually falls far short of warranting
the acceptance of (PEP3). For once we recognize that the notion of power
can be given (at a minimum) the two interpretations relevant to a discussion
of the Plantingean position-causal power as opposed to counterfactual
power-it becomes apparent that the truth expressed by Talbott by no means
entails (PEP3). If two propositions are logically equivalent and I have power
over the truth of one of them (i.e., its truth is up to me), then it does seem
clear that the truth of the other one is within my power as well; what does
not seem clear is that I need to have power in the same sense of "power" over
the second as over the first. Suppose I have causal power over the truth of
one of two logically equivalent propositions; is it not sufficient that I have
counterfactual power over the other? Is that not enough for me to say that
each of them is such that its truth is up to me?? Hasker gives us no reason to
think not. Hence, his defense of his argument via (PEP3) fails.
As noted, though, Hasker believes that another principle formulated by
Talbott can also be used to support the derivation of (B7). This principle is:
(PEP4) If (a) it is within 5's power to bring it about that P is true, (b) P
entails Q, and (c) Q is not a necessary condition of 5's having the
power to bring it about that P is true, then it is within 5's power to
bring it about that Q is true.

As with (PEP3), the connection between (PEP4) and (X) is not particularly
pellucid. Still, the usefulness of (PEP4) for Hasker's purposes is clear, as the
reader may ascertain by again letting "s" stand for Clarence, "P" for "Clarence refrains from having a cheese omelet tomorrow" and "0" for "God has
always believed that Clarence would refrain from having a cheese omelet
tomorrow." If (PEP4) is true, the Plantingean position is rendered untenable.
But why think that (PEP4) is true? Hasker quotes the following "proof' by
Talbott, a "proof' which he deems "both elegant and conclusive"s:
If P entails Q, then it's within the power of a person S to bring it about that
P is true only if at least one of these conditions is met: either Q is true or, if
not true, then it's within S's power to bring it about that Q is true. Suppose,
then, that P entails Q and it's not within S's power to bring it about that Q
is true. It immediately follows that, unless Q is true, it's not within S's power
to bring it about that P is true either; it follows, in other words, that Q is a
necessary condition of S's having the power to bring it about that P is true. 9

Now, let's consider this argument for (PEP4). In particular, let's focus on the
first sentence of the quotation from Talbott, a sentence which presents a long
and somewhat daunting premise. Suppose we again let" P" abbreviate "Clarence has the power to bring it about that" and change Talbott's upper case P
and 0 into lower case p and q. Talbott's premise (applied to Clarence) could
then be seen to have the form:
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If p entails q, then Pp only if either q or Pq.
But this is obviously equivalent to
If p entails q and Pp, then either q or Pq,

which in turn is equivalent to
If p entails q and Pp and - q, then Pq.
Using the double-line arrow (-) to represent entailment (i.e., strict implication), we can thus present Talbott's premise as
(Z) (p=q & Pp & - q)

::> Pq.

Now, for (Z) to playa role in supporting (PEP4), and thereby in the defense
of Hasker's argument for incompatibilism, it would have to be the kind of
premise which one would expect any reasonable Plantingean to accept. On
the face of it, though, (Z) simply does not appear to be such a premise; indeed,
given their views on our inability to bring about God's past beliefs,
Plantingeans would almost surely see nothing at all in (Z)'s favor. So it's
hard to see how the trotting forth of (Z) suffices to show that the entailment
of (B7) by (BS) and (B6) is something of which, as Hasker injudiciously puts
it, "there can be no reasonable doubt."'O
But the problem with (Z) runs deeper than its controversial nature within
this dialectical context. Suppose we transpose the first two conjuncts of its
antecedent; we would then have as an equivalent principle
(ZI) (Pp & p=-p & - q) ::> -Pq,

which in turn would obviously yield the equivalent
(Z2) (- Pq & p=q & - q)

::> - Pp.

Given the definition of entailment, (Z2) is itself equivalent to
(Z3) [- Pq & - 0 (p & q) & - q]

::>

Pp

Now, anyone of these equivalent (Z)s is supposed to be a general principle
applicable to any pair of propositions. So suppose we apply (Z3) to the case
of Clarence and the omelet. Replacing p with our original a (Clarence will
not have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow) and q with - b (It's not the
case that God has always believed that Clarence would have a cheese omelet
for breakfast tomorrow), we can derive
(Y) [-P-b & - 0 (a & b) & b] ::> -Pa

as an instantiation of (Z3). But once we see that (Z3) is nothing more than a
universal generalization of (Y), it becomes apparent that Hasker's second
argument for (X) is at least in the neighborhood of begging the question. For
(Y) is virtually equivalent to (X). The only difference between the two is that
(Y) has b as a third conjunct in its antecedent. But this difference is less than
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negligible, since it is a common assumption of all compatibilists that, as
premise (B3) states, b is true. Thus, the Plantingean who questions the truth
of (X) will have equal doubts concerning (Y). Since Talbott's premise (Z) is
equivalent to (Z3), and since (Z3) is nothing more than the universal generalization of (Y), it seems clear that no intelligent Plantingean should be expected to be swayed toward (X) by an argument which takes (Z) as one of
its premises. And insofar as the only argument for (PEP4) which Hasker
offers does employ (Z) as its sole premise, it follows that Hasker has provided
the Plantingean no reason whatsoever to think that (PEP4) is true.
Since neither of his attempts to fuse the compatibilist positions of Plantinga
and Mavrodes succeeds, the criticisms Hasker offers of the latter's position
are irrelevant to an evaluation of the Plantingean stance. Hence, Hasker fails
to show that the libertarian should view God's foreknowledge as incompatible
with our freedom.ll

University of Notre Dame

NOTES
1. William Hasker, ~Foreknowledge and Necessity," Faith alld Philosophy 2 (1985),
pp.121-57.
2. See George Mavrodes, ~Is the Past Unpreventable?," Faith and Philosophy 1, pp.
131-46.
3. See Alvin Plantinga,
235-69.

~On

Ockham's Way Out," Faith alld Philosophy 3 (1986), pp.

4. Actually, (X) could be presented as an entailment rather than a material conditional,
for Hasker is clearly committed to saying that [(B5) & (B6)] logically implies (B7).
However, since his Plantingean opponents will deny that even such material implications
are true, and since employing material rather than logical implications will make the
discussion of his argument a bit simpler, I have chosen to formulate (X) as a material
implication. The same course has been followed later in this paper with conditionals such
as (Y) and (Z).
5. Thomas Talbott, ~On Divine Foreknowledge and Bringing About the Past," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1986), pp. 455-69.
6. Talbott, p. 458.
7. Are there, one might ask, examples (other than the sort of which our statements
concerning Clarence's action and God's foreknowing are instances) the Plantingean might
offer of logically equivalent propositions only one of which is under a person's causal
power? Suppose we let "P" stand for "Clarence feeds his iguana" and ~Q" for "God wills
that Clarence feed his iguana," where the object of God's willing is understood to include
both those actions which God intends to be performed and those which he merely permits
to be performed. Would it not be reasonable here to hold that Clarence has causal power
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over P, but only counterfactual power over Q? Or take the case where ~P" stands for ~Jesus
says that Peter will freely deny him" and "Q" for "Peter will freely deny Jesus, just as
Jesus says he will." Does it not seem plausible to say that Jesus has causal power over P,
but only counterfactual power over Q? Whether or not these examples can be considered
in isolation from the freedom-foreknowledge dispute is, I think, debatable; still, they do
seem to me to offer further evidence against (PEP3).
8. Hasker, p. 143.
9. Talbott, p. 460.
10. Hasker, p. 144.
11. I am grateful to William Alston, Alfred Freddoso and Alvin Plantinga for comments
on an earlier draft of this paper.

